James Rogers

Director of the Cornell Brooks Tech Policy Institute

James Rogers, executive director of Cornell University’s Tech Policy Institute, says the common narrative is that every nation-state should rapidly adopt drones to stay competitive in future conflicts. 

Rogers says:

“But is that really true? There’s no doubt drones have played a critical role, particularly in enabling Ukraine to resist Russian aggression far longer than many expected. But it’s important to note: no side in this war has used drones to secure a decisive or transformational victory. So, have drones changed everything? Or is the story more nuanced?

“It’s certainly significant that a smaller state has used drones to hold off a larger, more heavily mechanized power in a high-intensity industrial conflict. But that leads to a deeper question: Should the U.S.—with the most advanced and powerful military in the world—be drawing the same lessons from Ukraine and Russia?

“These are essential questions. They challenge us to think beyond the hype and ask: What types of drones are actually useful for the future of U.S. force deployment? How do they compare to the capabilities the U.S. already has—like precision-guided munitions and long-range artillery? And, most importantly, which systems are worth investing in—and why?”

Sarah Kreps

Professor of Government

Sarah Kreps, professor of government and law, and founding director of the Tech Policy Institute says the idea of supplementing or replacing heavy equipment with unmanned systems isn’t new.

Kreps says:  

“What’s changed is the urgency. Ukraine’s war offered a proof of concept: cheap, networked drones can disrupt expensive platforms and reshape battlefield awareness with far less risk than manned systems. The Army’s move isn’t surprising—it’s a long-overdue response. But buying 1,000 drones per division doesn’t guarantee success. 

“Ukraine’s effectiveness came from improvisation, asymmetry, and deep civilian tech integration—factors that don’t map neatly onto the U.S. military. The Army can’t just replicate Ukraine. The more important story may be institutional: a $36 billion pivot signals not just what the Army is buying, but what it’s willing to cut. The real fight may be internal—between entrenched interests and organizational culture and the pressure to modernize.”