The sound of drones, the movements of satellites, the everyday activities of scientific research stations: all might seem like harmless, granular information. But when enough is scraped and aggregated? 

“At scale, benign data becomes intelligence,” said Greg Falco ’10, assistant professor of mechanical and aerospace engineering in the Cornell Duffield College of Engineering.

Credit: Senate U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission

In testimony before the congressional U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission on April 30, Falco explained how this low-level “pattern-of-life” data can reveal the purpose, intent and function of activities and technology with both civilian and military – or dual-use – applications, and how that knowledge can be leveraged for tactical advantage.

“Pattern-of-life data becomes strategically powerful at scale because it allows an adversary to understand system capabilities and predict future behavior with high confidence,” Falco said.

The commission invited Falco to testify about China’s expanding strategy for data acquisition and exploitation, with the aim of helping Congress develop policy recommendations to strengthen U.S. technological leadership and security in an increasingly contested global environment.

Low-level data has grown in strategic value, according to Falco, due to the rise of machine learning and large-scale data processing.

“What was once too complex or voluminous to interpret can now be processed, correlated and acted upon in near real time,” he said.

This is a key part of China’s broader approach. 

“China is not collecting data for isolated insights. It is building a large-scale data dragnet to extract pattern-of-life across systems and environments,” Falco said. “The objective is to move from observation to prediction, and from prediction to strategic advantage.”

Among the targets that are vulnerable to this strategy are drone systems that generate a continuous stream of structured telemetry data, such as radio-frequency transmission patterns, GPS coordinates and power consumption – all “exhaust signals of a system,” Falco said. 

In particular, acoustic sensing is highly revealing, he noted, as it provides access to processes, not just appearances, and different propulsion systems generate distinct acoustic signatures.

“This type of acoustic inference becomes significantly more powerful when fused with telemetry, geolocation and RF data, enabling high-confidence assessments of system behavior and operational intent,” he said.

Another potential security risk that can leveraged are science research platforms, specifically ones in regions where the U.S. has reduced its level of engagement and investment.

“China is deliberately filling the gap through a coordinated science diplomacy strategy, establishing strategically placed research stations that function as dual-use data collection platforms for both civilian collaboration and military-relevant intelligence gathering,” Falco said.

For example, ionospheric sensing from remote and polar research stations enables China to detect and characterize otherwise undisclosed U.S. space and launch activities without direct observation, according to Falco.

These research platforms are not only located on Earth. Spacecraft can fulfill a similar function, collecting data that is typically inaccessible. But by doing so, they reveal their capabilities.  

“Understanding how U.S. systems behave allows China to design operations that exploit timing gaps, avoid detection thresholds, or apply pressure without crossing perceived redlines,” he said.

One technological component that unites all these systems and generates much-coveted “data exhaust” of its own is the semiconductor. In semiconductors, the most granular and least protected data – i.e., “side-channel” signals such as power consumption and electromagnetic emissions – can be accessed and exploited at scale, Falco said.

“By extracting and exploiting low-level signals from chips embedded across critical systems, China can build a detailed understanding of system behavior that feeds directly into higher-level mission inference and capability characterization across domains.”

Taken together, all of this data shows not only what a system is doing, but how it is being used and how it fits into a broader mission.

These security risks are compounded by the fact that allied nations perceive the threats differently and they have no coordinated policy framework yet.

In his testimony, Falco made a series of policy recommendations for the U.S.:

• Establish stricter requirements for the monitoring and restriction of foreign components in critical aerospace, defense and infrastructure systems;
• Reinvest in scientific presence and influence in global environments where underlying data and infrastructure are being established; prioritize international scientific partnerships that align with U.S. strategic interests; and support the creation of joint research and testing initiatives with allied nations;
• Promoting security-by-design – i.e., process-based approaches that integrate security into system architecture from the outset – through standards and procurement.

“To respond effectively, the United States needs to move beyond reactive measures,” Falco said in conclusion. “It must secure the foundational layers of its systems, maintain a presence in key data-generating environments and embed security into system design and governance from the start. This competition is about understanding how systems operate and turning that technical understanding into strategic advantage.”